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Environmental Law: CERCLA Liability of
Corporate Parents for Their Dissolved or

Undercapitalized Subsidiaries
Introduction
Laws hastily enacted to protect our environment have proven quite difficult to integrate with other more established bodies of law. This tension
is readily evidenced under circumstances when environmental and corporate
laws interact. Presently, certain environmental laws are threatening the very
existence of what is possibly the most fundamental corporate law doctrine
- limited liability. This note focuses on the circumstances and competing
policy interests which have brought about this critical juncture in the
evolution of our law.
Part I of this note introduces CERCLA and its interaction with the
corporate doctrine of limited liability. More specifically, this section defines
the circumstances which have brought into question the CERCLA liability
of parent corporations for their subsidiaries. Part II discusses various theories of CERCLA liability and focuses on the specific statutory language
which has made questionable the liability of corporate parents. Part III
discusses the concepts of "piercing the corporate veil," the "alter ego))
doctrine and the relationship these concepts have to the issue of parent
liability in the CERCLA context. Parts IV and V analyze two conflicting
approaches recently taken by courts addressing the parent liability issue.
Finally, part VI proposes that the solution to this issue is a uniform alter
ego doctrine which more equitably balances the competing policy interests.
L
A.

Interaction of Environmental and Corporate Laws

CERCLA

In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)' in response to an increasing
national concern for our environment. CERCLA's basic purpose is to
provide emergency cleanup procedures upon discovery of any hazardous
substances being released into the environment. 2 To fulfill this purpose,
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(Supp. IV 1986)).

2. Specifically, CERCLA was enacted in response to problems associated with inactive
hazardous waste sites. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a) (Supp. IV 1986). This problem has been
recognized as the result of certain deficiencies of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See generally CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(Supp. IV 1986).
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Congress included guidelines for determining the liability of "persons"
3
responsible for contaminating the environment.
CERCLA imposes liability on "persons" who "own or operate" a "facility" at which there is a "release of hazardous substances."14 However,
determining liability for a release of hazardous substances is often difficult.
While CERCLA provides some broad guidelines,' extensive litigation may
be necessary to clearly establish each responsible party. In such cases,
protracted litigation often results in continued pollution of the environment.
To eliminate this problem, Congress created a "Superfund" in conjunction with CERCLA. 6 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
similar state agencies may draw from Superfund to conduct immediate
7
cleanup operations and seek reimbursement from responsible parties later.
Obviously, liability must still be determined in order to prevent eventual
8
depletion of the Superfund.
B. The Role of Corporations in the Environment
The persons responsible for most large releases of hazardous waste are
not individuals, but corporations. 9 Many corporations utilize manufacturing
processes that gener'ate toxic byproducts.' 0 Any corporation which generates,

transports, or disposes of toxic waste may be held directly liable as a
responsible "person" under CERCLA. 11
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1986).
4. Section 9601 of CERCLA provides rather lengthy definitions of "persons," "facility,"
"release" and "hazardous substances." Id. § 9601. The meaning of each of these terms has
been litigated extensively. However, any controversy associated with these terms is beyond the
scope of this note. This note is concerned primarily with the meaning of the language "owner
or operator," which is discussed at length later in the text.
5. Id. § 9607.
6. The Superfund was formally referred to as the Hazardous Substance Superfund. Id. §
9607. It was established by an amendment to CERCLA known as the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in
scattered sections of 10, 29, 33 & 42 U.S.C.).
7. The procedure enabling federal and state governments to make claims against the
Superfund is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611-9612 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. The $1.6 billion fund was jointly financed by the federal government and the petrochemical industry. Anderson, Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State
CorporateDissolutionLaw, 88 MICE. L. REv. 131 (1989).
9. Dellecker, The Preemptive Scope of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980: Necessity for an Active State Role, 34 U. FLA. L.
Rnv. 635, 635-36 (1982).
10. Disposal of such byproducts often requires sophisticated equipment and elaborate safety
procedures. As a result, other corporations now actually provide the services of transporting
and disposing of hazardous byproducts. The manifestation of these new industries is reflected
by the liability provisions under § 9607(a)(I)-(4) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV

1986).
11. CERCLA states, in pertinent part:
(21) "person" means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership,
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body
(emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9607 (Supp. IV 1986). See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8, at 133-34.
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1. The CorporateForm of Ownership
The fact that corporations are responsible for the majority of hazardous

waste problems is no surprise. Today, the corporation is the chief form of
business organization in the United States. 12 Corporate ownership is popular

because shareholders have no liability beyond their investments unless a
plaintiff can "pierce the corporate veil.' ' 3 Notwithstanding its recognition
as a basic tenet of corporate law

4

the concept of limited liability is being

threatened under the circumstances discussed in this note.
2.

The Parent/SubsidiaryRelationship

In recent years, corporate ownership has become more complex. Corpo-

rations often purchase or create one or more subsidiary corporations, each
of which conducts a different type of business. 5 In this situation, a parent
corporation, rather than an individual, is the subsidiary's controlling shareholder.' 6 If a subsidiary is not financially stable, the parent may dissolve
the subsidiary, 7 sell it to another corporation, or absorb its assets.'8 As
with personal corporate ownership, the parent is normally not liable beyond
its investment in the subsidiary.' 9
C. A Parent'sLiability Under CERCLA for its Responsible Subsidiary
A corporation can be liable as a "responsible person" under CERCLA. 20
Unfortunately, in creating CERCLA, Congress failed to specifically confront
12. R.C. CLARK, CoRPoRATE LAW § 1.1, at 1 (1986).
13. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS oF CoRPoRATIONs AND OTmR Busn;Ess ENTERPRISE § 73, at 130 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter HE-NN & ALEXANDER]. However, there are a
number of other reasons for the popularity of the corporate form of ownership. See, e.g.,
Douglas & Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,39 YALE L.J.
193 (1929). See notes 45-47 and accompanying text, in which the concept of "piercing the
corporate veil" is discussed in greater depth.
14. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 13, at 130. For a general discussion of limited
liability in the parent/subsidiary context, see Douglas & Shanks, supra note 13.
15. A subsidiary corporation is "one in which another corporation (i.e. parent) owns at
least a majority of the shares, and thus has control." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1280 (5th ed.
1979). The term subsidiary is used to denote a company "more than 50 percent of whose
voting stock is owned by another." Id.
16. A parent corporation is one which has working control through stock ownership of its
subsidiary corporations. Id. at 1004.
17. The dissolution of a corporation is the termination of its existence as a body politic.
Dissolution may occur "by act of the legislature ...; by surrender or forfeiture of its charter;
by expiration of its charter by a lapse of time, by proceedings for winding it up under the
law; by loss of all its members or the reduction below the statutory limit; by bankruptcy."
Id. at 425.
18. This note refers to the dissolution process only to exemplify a general pattern of
circumstances under which the issue of parent liability often arises. For a more thorough
discussion of corporate dissolution in this context, see Anderson, supra note 8.
19. See generally Ballentine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14
CALM. L. REv. 12 (1925). See also Douglas & Shanks, supra note 13.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. IV 1986).
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the issue of parent corporations' liability for their responsible subsidiaries. 2
Consider this scenario:
P (parent corporation) owns S (subsidiary corporation). S owns and
operates a plant at which there is a release of hazardous substances. After
the release, S is dissolved. C (party which cleaned up the hazardous substances - often the federal and/or state government) sues S under CERCLA
for the costs incu:rred in conducting cleanup operations. However, S, the
responsible party, no longer exists.
These circumstances raise the question addressed by this note: Can the
parent be held directly liable as an "owner or operator" under CERCLA
for the release caused by its dissolved or judgment-proof subsidiary? Recent
court decisions have given both affirmative and negative answers to this
question.
L
A.

CERCLA Liability

Scope of Liability Under CERCLA
1. Strict Liability

Most jurisdictions have held that CERCLA is a strict liability statute.
Courts have reached this conclusion despite Congress' failure to include an
express provision for strict liability. 22 In imposing strict liability, courts have
relied primarily on title 42, section 9601(32) which states that liability under
CERCLA "shall be construed to be the standard of liability" found in
section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 23 The
standard of liability under the Clean Water Act has consistently been
construed as strict liability.2 Thus, if a party is deemed to be a responsible
person, strict liability is imposed?.
2. Joint and Several Liability
Courts have also, under certain circumstances, held that CERCLA imposes
joint and several liability.2 6 Again, courts have reached this conclusion even
though Congress specifically deleted the language supporting such liability
21. Note, Liability of Parent Corporationfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99
HARV. L. Rav. 986 (1S86) [hereinafter Note, Liability].
22. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990); United States
v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Southland
Corp. v. Ashland Oil Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) provides: "'Liable' or 'liability' under this subchapter shall be
construed to be the stamdard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1986).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1981). For a, discussion in this regard, see Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 844.
24. NortheasternPharm. & Chem., 579 F. Supp. at 844.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
See also United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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from CERCLA just prior to its enactment. 27 Courts imposing joint and
several liability rely on certain legislative history which suggests that the
scope of liability under CERCLA should be determined under common law
principles.u Thus, because CERCLA actions often involve complex factual
circumstances associated with multiple-generator waste sites, 29 joint and
several liability has been deemed appropriate.
3.

Successor Liability

Courts' imposition of strict or joint and several liability in CERCLA
actions has been extended to impose liability on successors to hazardous
waste site ownership. 0 When one corporation purchases or receives the
assets of another, the purchasing corporation is normally not liable for the
debts and liabilities of the corporation being purchased. 3 However, under
CERCLA, the purchasing corporation is the present "owner" of a hazardous
waste site.3 2 Therefore, applying principles of strict liability, the successor
corporation may be liable under CERCLA, even though it did not contribute
to the release of hazardous substances by the corporation being purchased.33
Furthermore, when a subsidiary is dissolved and the assets merged into its
parent, the parent may be considered "a mere continuation" of the subsidiary.3 4 Under such circumstances, the parent may be held fully liable for a
hazardous release caused by its subsidiary.35
The trend toward the imposition of successor liability clearly shows courts'
extreme concern for CERCLA's broad remedial purpose. Accordingly, many
36
courts have liberally construed certain liability provisions under CERCLA.
However, other courts have been much more conservative in their interpretation of such provisions.3 7 The following section discusses the specific
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV 1986). Language recommending that liability not be joint
and several can be found in legislative history. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 6137 (1980). Such language was deleted prior to codification.
28. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808.
29. This term refers to sites where the waste which has collected or accumulated can be
attributed to numerous "persons" as defined by CERCLA. Id. Because it is often difficult to
determine the specific amount and toxicity of the waste contributed by each generator, joint
and several liability has been applied.
30. United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 615-17 (E.D. Ark. 1987);
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
31. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1308.
32. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1063.
33. Id.
34. The "mere continuation" doctrine is a test by which courts determine successor liability.
The factors emphasized in this doctrine are "a common identity between officers, directors,
and stock between the selling and purchasing corporations ..... " Vertac Chemical Corp., 671
F. Supp. at 614-15 (quoting Tucker v. Paxon Machine Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir.
1981)). This concept should be distinguished from a de facto merger which occurs where two
corporations are merged but fall to comply with statutory regulations governing merger. Id.
at 615. Both of these concepts are similar in nature to the alter ego doctrine which is discussed
at length later in the text. See notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
35. Vertac Chemical Corp., 671 F. Supp. at 615.
36. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
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liability provisions which have created controversy on the parent liability
issue.
B.

The Meaning of "Owner/Operator"

CERCLA imposes liability on four classes of persons. 8 The class relevant
to the issue of parent liability is defined as "any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of .... -39
Section 9601(20)(A) defines "owner or operator" as "any person owning
or operating such facility .... ."4 The term "person" includes corporations. 4' Consequently, the critical questions are whether a parent corporation
is an "owner or operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability, and if so,
under what circumstances. 42 As presented by most courts addressing this
38. The four classes are:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, for which there is a release, or threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
39. Id. § 9607(a)(1). (2) (emphasis added). Subsections (3) and (4) require the presence of
certain facts which are generally beyond the scope of this note. These circumstances are briefly
addressed in this note, at text accompanying supra notes 9-19. For purposes of this analysis,
it is the meaning of "owner or operator" under subsections (1) and (2) which must be carefully
scrutinized.
40. Subsection (i) refers specifically to "owners and operators of vessels" and is therefore
of no concern in this paper.
(20)(A) "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and
(iii) in the case of any facility, title of control of which was conveyed due to
bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a
unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not
include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the vessel or facility.
Id. § 9601(20)(A).
41. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
42. The distinction between "owner" and "operator" is somewhat confusing in the parent/
subsidiary context. There is little doubt that a corporation may be held directly liable as the
present owner of a hazardous waste site, or as a past owner of the site at a time when there
was a release of hazardous substances. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985). However, courts have apparently not decided whether a parent
corporation may be held directly liable for its subsidiary where it simply owns the subsidiary
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issue, the ultimate question is whether the parent can be held directly liable

as an "operator" under CERCLA, or whether the corporate veil between
43
the parent and the subsidiary must first be pierced.

II. Piercing the Corporate Veil Via

the Alter Ego Doctrine
A.

Piercing the Corporate Veil
When a plaintiff pierces the corporate veil, the court "disregard[s] the

usual immunity of corporate officers or entities from liability for corporate
activities."4 Where the corporate veil is pierced in the parent/subsidiary

4
context, courts ignore the corporate separateness between the two entities. 1

Thus, the parent, as the primary shareholder, may be liable for damages

beyond the amount it has invested in the subsidiary.4
The corporate veil issue is critical in CERCLA actions because frequently

the enormous cost of cleaning up the released hazardous substances exceeds
the entire value of the responsible subsidiary.47 Furthermore, when the

and does not operate it. In this situation, the parent does not actually own the site at which
the release has occurred. Instead, the parent merely owns the subsidiary which, in turn, owns
the site.
It stands to reason that courts would not attach liability to the parent under such circumstances. This presumption follows from the fact that courts supporting direct operator liability
are concerned primarily with the parent corporation's control over its subsidiary. Further,
direct owner liability in the parent/subsidiary context would mean that a corporation may be
held directly liable for a subsidiary's actions although its ownership of the subsidiary is merely
indirect. Clearly, such a rule takes no account of the corporate fiction.
Several courts have implied that the parent's mere awareness of, and ability to prevent, its
subsidiary's CERCLA-violative behavior is sufficient to create liability. See e.g., United States
v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984). Additionally,
at least two commentators argue that the imposition of direct liability on parent corporations
is warranted by the mere fact of ownership. Allen, Refining The Scope Of CERCLA's
Corporate Veil Piercing Remedy, 6 STAN. ENwVr'L L.J. 43 (1986-87). See also Note, Liability,
supra note 21. These views are discussed at greater length at infra text accompanying notes
129-36.
Nevertheless, most courts appear to be focusing on the nature and substance of the parent's
ownership rather than the mere fact of pure ownership. See, e.g., United States v. McGrawEdison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.Y. 1989) (court considered liability of one corporation
which was a 49 percent shareholder in another corporation). Therefore, the central concern of
this note is direct operatorliability.
43. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
44. BLAcK's LAW DICT oNARY 1033 (5th ed. 1979). See also Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611
F.2d 703, 709 (8th Cir. 1979); Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir.
1981); DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir.
1976).
45. Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 614 F.2d 990, 996 (5th
Cir. 1980); Rose Hall Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking, 576 F. Supp. 107, 130 (D.
Del. 1983).
46. See, e.g., Chrome Plate Inc., 614 F.2d at 996.
47. For a discussion regarding the extreme cost of environmental cleanup, see Proper
Hazardous Waste Disposal is Cheaper, EPA Administrator Says, 9 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2082,
2082 (Mar. 4, 1979).
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responsible subsidiary is dissolved prior to being sued, the assets of the
subsidiary are frequently sold to another corporation or simply merged into
the parent corporation.48 In either case, the party who cleaned up the waste
may experience extreme difficulty in recovering all of the expenses it has
incurred.
In such a situation, the party bringing suit may naturally look to the
subsidiary's parent for reimbursement. Under the customary presumption
of limited liability, the party seeking recovery would be required to pierce
the veil between the parent and the subsidiary to recover anything beyond
the total capital of the subsidiary. 49 However, the presumption of limited
liability has traditionally been extremely difficult to overcome.50
B.

The Alter Ego Doctrine

While the doctrine of limited liability remains a well-established rule in
the law of corporations,5 ' courts recognize several equitable exceptions to
the rule.5 2 One such exception is known as the "alter ego" doctrine, or the

"instrumentality rule." 3
Where a parent corporation "totally dominates and controls its subsidiary," the subsidiary may be considered merely the alter ego or instrument
of its parent.14 In this situation, courts will allow the corporate veil to be
pierced. However, courts have experienced several problems in applying the
alter ego doctrine in CERCLA actions.
1. Alter Ego Doctrine as a Function of State Corporation Law
The alter ego doctrine is a vague concept which has been subject to a
variety of interpretations. 5 The confusion surrounding this concept can be
attributed to several sources. Local interests have demanded that corporate
law be developed primarily by state legislatures.1 6 Accordingly, standards
for the alter ego doctrine often vary in relation to differing state corporate
48. United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 615-16 (E.D. Ark. 1987).
49. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
50. See generally Note, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal
Common Law, 95 Hv. L. Rlv. 853, 854 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Corporate Veil.
51. Id.

52. Equitable exceptions are generally found under circumstances where there has been an
abuse of the corporate form. See, e.g., Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chemical and Oil Corp., 753
F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1985) (when corporate form is abused equity warrants piercing the corporate
veil). For example, two recognized exceptions are where the corporate form is used fraudulently
or to carry out illegal purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686,
691 (5th Cir. 1985).
53. Alter ego means "second self." Under this doctrine, the court disregards the corporate
entity and holds the individual shareholder (in this context, a parent corporation) responsible
for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation (in this context, the
parent's subsidiary). The alter ego doctrine is also known as the "instrumentality rule." See
BLACK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 71, 720 (5th ed. 1979).
54. Jon-T Chems., 768 F.2d at 691 (citing Nelson v. International Paint Co., Inc., 734
F.2d 1084, 1091-93 (5th Cir. 1984)). See generally Note, Corporate Veil, supra note 50.
55. Jon-T Chems., 768 F.2d at 691. See generally Note, Corporate Veil, supra note 50.
56. Note, Corporate Veil, supra note 50, at 857.
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laws. 57 Application of the doctrine is further complicated because cases in
which the doctrine is appropriate are generally very fact-specific." Therefore,
states have adopted inconsistent tests by which to determine whether the
corporate veil should be pierced.5 9
Rather than developing a workable standard, courts have instead articulated a "laundry list" of factors which aid in determining whether a
subsidiary is, in fact, the alter ego of its parent. 60 Most courts agree that
an alter ego finding "rests on the totality of the circumstances. ' 61 The
presence of each factor is not required. 62 Instead, courts look for any
combination which sufficiently evidences parental domination of the subsidiary.

63

While some states consider only factors showing extreme control, others
have applied a two-pronged test. 64 Under this test, the first prong requires
an examination of factors traditionally viewed as indicia of parental control
over the subsidiary. 65 The second prong requires that "if the acts are treated
as those of the [subsidiary] corporation alone, an inequitable result will
follow.""6 Still other courts require a showing of fraud to establish abuse

of the corporate form. 67 Regardless of which test is used, an alter ego

57. However, there is frequently a great deal of confusion as to whether the state standard
should be applied. Id. This problem is discussed at greater length at infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
58. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution,
675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987).
59. See generally Note, Corporate Veil, supra note 50.
60. These factors include:
(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership;
(2) the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers;
(3) the parent and the subsidiary have common business departments;
(4) the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax
returns;
(5) the parent finances the subsidiary;
(6) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary;
(7) the subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate capital;
(8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary;
(9) the subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent;
(10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property as its own;
(11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept separate; and
(12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic formalities, such as keeping separate
books and records and holding shareholder and board meetings.
Jon-T Chems., 768 F.2d at 691-92.
61. Id. at 694 n.8.
62. Id.
63. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987).
64. Note, Corporate Veil, supra note 50, at 854-55 (citing Automotoriz Del Golfo de Cal.
S.A. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957)).
65. Id. at 854.
66. Id.
67. Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977, 980-82 (5th Cir. 1984) (court held
fraud an essential element to an alter ego finding in contract cases); cf. Baker v. Raymond
International, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179-80 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (court recognized fraud
as one element which would support disregard of corporate entity).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:345

finding depends heavily upon the facts of the particular case. s Accordingly,
there has been little uniformity in the application of the alter ego doctrine.
2. No Uniform Standard Under Federal Common Law
Problems associated with the alter ego doctrine are exacerbated in the
context of federal question litigation (the setting of most CERCLA actions).
Federal courts often hold that state law does not directly control federal
question litigation.i 9 Courts have, in certain limited areas, found it necessary
to espouse what has been termed as federal common law. 70 Federal common
law is typically created where courts desire uniformity in the application of
a federal statute, but state law serves to frustrate the statute's broad intent.
Cases involving CERCLA certainly appear to be one of those limited areas. 71
However, in search of uniformity, federal courts have encountered what
has been referred to as a legal quagmire.7 2 Indeed, the federal common law
concerning the alter ego doctrine is often less clear than if a particular state
standard were controlling. Thus, while courts may look to federal common
law to ensure uniformity in the application of certain CERCLA provisions,
uniformity has yet to be established with respect to the alter ego doctrine.
3.

Conflicting Policy Interests

Courts addressing the issue of a parent corporation's liability are clearly
faced with conflicting policy interests. On one hand, the concepts of limited
liability and the! corporate veil are deeply rooted in our history. These
entrepreneurial concepts which support risk taking have been instrumental
in the development of our society.73 On the other hand, CERCLA's function
is no less significant. Its broad purpose is to prevent further destruction of

68. See, e.g., FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Illinois law).
69. Illinois v. Milwaukee 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek

Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). For this reason, this note is not specifically concerned with
Oklahoma law. However, there is some disagreement as to whether state or federal common
law should control. This disagreement arises where, as here, a case involves a federal statute
which has no express provisions regarding the federal statute's preemption of particular state
statutes. For example, where a state has a statute specifically stating an alter ego standard and
the federal statute is silent, there is disagreement as to whether that state's law should be
applied. In such cases, the courts often look to legislative history behind the statute. Many
courts have held that federal programs such as CERCLA mandate uniform application and
thus must be governed by federal common law. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F.
Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
70. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947)) (Court held that development of federal
common law is necessary where a federal rule of decision is needed to preserve unique federal
interests, or where Congress has granted courts power to formulate substantive law).
71. See, e.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 809.
72. United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Ballentine, supra note 19, at 15).
73. See generally Douglas & Shanks, supra note 13.
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our environment by effectuating cleanup operations and imposing liability
on responsible parties.74
Courts attempting to mesh the competing interests of these bodies of law
are faced with a serious dilemma. Seemingly, one body of law must be
eliminated in order to accommodate the other. Not surprisingly, courts have
expressed different approaches as to the proper resolution of these problems.
III. Recent Decisions: Derivative v. Direct Liability
Courts have recognized two basic approaches in resolving the issue of a
parent corporation's liability for its CERCLA-liable subsidiary. One approach adheres to traditional corporate doctrines, thereby requiring a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold the parent liable beyond
its investment in the subsidiary.7 5 The other approach simply ignores the
corporate veil-piercing requirement entirely.76 These two approaches and
their underlying theories of support are discussed in the following three

sections.
A.

Protection of TraditionalCorporate Doctrines

The issue of parental liability for a dissolved subsidiary was specifically
77
addressed in Joslyn Manufacturing. Co. v. T.L. James & Co. In Joslyn,
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality issued orders to certain
parties, including Joslyn, requiring investigation and cleanup of a former
creosoting plant in Bossier City, Louisiana. Joslyn brought a CERCLA
action against T.L. James & Co., Inc. (James), a former parent of the
Lincoln Creosoting Plant (Lincoln).
74. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 835-37
(W.D. Mo. 1984); see also Dellecker, supra note 9, at 635-38. See generally CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1986).
75. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990); Wehner v.
Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D. Mo. 1985); In re Acushnet River, 675 F.
Supp. 22, 33-34 (D. Mass. 1987); Jon-T Chems., 768 F.2d at 691-93.
76. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989); United States v. Mottolo, 695
F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671-72 (D.
Idaho 1986); NortheasternPharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. at 847-50. See generally United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
In Kayser-Roth, the lower court recognized this approach to contain two sub-approaches.
Under one line of authority, courts hold liable as an "operator" any stockholder which
manages the responsible corporation. These courts place significance on CERCLA's definition
of owner or operator which bars from liability "a person, who without participating in the
management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the ... facility." United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.R.I.
1989) (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052 and Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. at 848). Viewing this language, these courts reason that any person which holds indicia
of ownership and does participate in management, is liable. Id.
The other line of decisions holds that a "stockholder, parent corporation, or any person
associated with a facility," regardless of whether he has ownership interest, may be held liable
if such person controls the management of the responsible corporation. Id.
77. Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 80.
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Joslyn claimed that because James owned and operated the subsidiary
creosoting plant, it should be held directly liable for cleanup operations
under CERCLA. 71 Joslyn argued that it did not have to pierce the corporate
veil to directly sue James. 79 The Fifth Circuit rejected Joslyn's argument,
holding that, under such circumstances, Joslyn could not recover unless it
presented evidence that would warrant piercing the corporate veil between
James and its subsidiary creosoting plant, Lincoln. 0
The Fifth Circuit further held that the circumstances did not warrant
piercing the corporate veil."' The court based this holding on several factors.
First, Lincoln maintained its own books and records and held frequent
shareholder and directors meetings.12 Second, Lincoln's daily operations
were completely separate from those of James. 3 Third, Lincoln and James
filed separate tax returns.84 Finally, Lincoln paid its own bills and arranged
85
for its own employee benefits.
B. Erosion of TraditionalCorporateDoctrines
More recently, the First Circuit reached the opposite conclusion addressing
the same issue in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.16 In Kayser-Roth, the
United States brought action under CERCLA to recover cleanup costs
resulting from a spill of hazardous substances. The release of these substances was found to have been caused primarily by Stamina Mills, Inc., a
now-defunct corporation. Kayser-Roth Corporation (Kayser-Roth) was the
parent corporation and sole shareholder of Stamina Mills, Inc.
Ignoring the traditional presumption of limited liability, the court held
that Kayser-Roth was directly liable as an "operator" under CERCLA.17
The court relied most heavily on the fact that Kayser-Roth had exercised
nearly total control over Stamina Mills.8" The court provided a number of
factors showing such control. 9
First, Kayser-Roth exerted total monetary control over Stamina Mills. 9°
Second, it placed restrictions on Stamina Mills' budget. 9' Third, it issued a
directive that subsidiary-governmental contact, including environmental matters, be channeled directly through Kayser-Roth. 92 Fourth, any leasing,
buying or selling by Stamina Mills required prior approval by Kayser-Roth. 9
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 30 (lst Cir. 1990).
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Fifth, any capital transfers or expenditures by Stamina Mills exceeding
$5,000 required prior approval by Kayser-Roth.Y Finally, almost all director
and officer positions at Stamina Mills were held by Kayser-Roth personnel. 9"
The court concluded that because Kayser-Roth had total control over Stamina Mills' operations, it was, in fact, operating this subsidiary."
Theories Supporting the Differing Approaches

C.
1.

Derivative Liability Approach

Joslyn represents one approach in deciding cases involving corporate
parent liability under CERCLA.Y That line of decisions adheres to the
traditional corporate law doctrine of limited liability. 98 Consequently, under
this view, plaintiffs may seek reimbursement only from the violating corporation itself, not from its parent company or shareholders. Only where
the facts show control sufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil will
these courts recognize an exception to the presumption of limited liability.
Where the corporate veil can be pierced, courts impose derivative liability
on the parent for the actions of its subsidiary." In reaching this conclusion,
courts have generally provided two substantial arguments.
First, the concept of limited liability is well established in the law of
corporations. 100 This concept, which was developed to promote risk taking,
has played a significant role in the expansion of industry and the growth
of trade and commerce. ' ° 1 While CERCLA's goals are important, they
certainly do not mandate completely doing away with an entire body of law
which is so firmly rooted in our history.102
Second, under fundamental principles of statutory construction, °3 CERCLA's language clearly does not justify such a total departure from wellestablished concepts of corporate law.' °4 CERCLA's definition of owners
94. Id.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See generally Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).
98. Id.
99. The term "derivative" is somewhat confusing. Under an alter ego finding, a court is
essentially proclaiming that a parent corporation has so dominated its subsidiary so that the
two seem to be one in the same. One may logically conclude that under such a finding, courts
are simply holding a parent corporation directly liable. Indeed, alter ego is defined as "second
self." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 71 (5th ed. 1979). However, courts instead view the parent's
liability in terms of an agency theory. See, e.g, In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32
(D. Mass. 1987). In other words, in cases of extreme parental control, the subsidiary is
considered an agent of the parent. Id. Thus, it appears that the name "alter ego" is misleading
in itself. This misleading terminology may be largely responsible for the conflicting approaches
taken by the courts.
100. See Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 32-34.
101. In fact, it has been further argued that a direct liability approach would "discourage
investors, and reduce the number of solvent corporations" from which parties seeking recovery
may obtain reimbursement. Id. at 32.
102. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82-84 (5th Cir. 1990).
103. For a good discussion of statutory construction rules in this general context, see United
States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1304-05 (D.N.C. 1982).
104. Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 82.
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or operators does not include parent companies of wholly-owned CERCLAliable subsidiaries." 5 Further, there is little evidence of legislative intent to
do away with the concept of limited liability in CERCLA actions.'06 Therefore, in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, traditional
corporate doctrines should control the analysis of parental liability. 07
Courts utilizing the above rationale have upheld the corporate veil-piercing
requirement. 08 However, the few courts which have addressed the issue
have carefully scrutinized factors such as those mentioned in the Joslyn
decision to determine whether the subsidiary is merely the alter ego of its
parent. In fact, at least one court faced with this precise issue allowed the
corporate veil to be pierced under the alter ego doctrine.' 9 Such a liberal
application of the alter ego doctrine is interesting as few courts have
addressed this issue." 0
2. Direct Liability Approach
Jurisdictions which have taken the Kayser-Roth approach claim that the
corporate veil need not be pierced."' Under this line of decisions, courts
hold that parent corporations can be directly liable as "operators" under
CERCLA." 2 Those courts also provide several significant reasons for their
conclusion.
First, requiring the traditionally strict standard of corporate veil-piercing
would allow parent corporations to escape liability by purposely undercapitalizing or dissolving subsidiaries potentially liable under CERCLA."3 If
such parents continually escape liability, the Superfund, which is largely
comprised of taxpayers' money, will require constant replenishment." 4
Second, CERCLA's construction as a strict, joint and several liability
statute supports holding parent corporations directly liable." 5 To determine
liability by focusing solely on the corporate form would frequently allow
those corporations which knew of, had capacity to prevent, and benefitted
from a release of hazardous substances to escape liability." 6 Certainly,
Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA was to impose liability on parties
who benefit from the pollution.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 75.
United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 696 (5th Cir. 1985).

110. This may suggest a less rigorous standard for piercing the corporate veil in the CERCLA
context. This leniency indicates that courts on both sides of the issue are truly reaching the
same conclusions, despite language to the contrary.
11I. See supra note 76.
112. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
113. See United State3 v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988).
114. This idea has been explicitly addressed by at least one commentator. Allen, supra note
42, at 49.
115. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 84849 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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Finally, an analysis of the legislative history behind CERCLA supports
the imposition of direct liability on parent corporations."17 There is no
language in the legislative history which would prevent holding parent
corporations directly liable as operators." 8 Because CERCLA is remedial in
nature, its language should be construed liberally to prevent frustration of
its legislative purpose.11 9 In other words, the mere corporateness of an entity
should not be allowed to defeat CERCLA's purported goal.1 20 Therefore,
the broad remedial intent behind CERCLA compels a departure from
21
traditional corporate doctrines under these circumstances.
These arguments are indicative of the rationale behind the direct liability
approach. Applying such rationale, courts supporting this approach firmly
argue that a parent corporation may be directly liable as an operator.
However, the Kayser-Roth court recognized that for a parent to be liable
as an operator of its subsidiary "requires more than merely complete
ownership" and the general authority and control associated with such
ownership.'2 Interestingly, the Kayser-Roth court also noted, "It is obviously not the usual case that the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary is an
operator of the subsidiary."'12 Most courts supporting the direct liability
approach have, therefore, focused on factors which show extreme or total
parental control over the subsidiary.
IV.

Analysis

Unquestionably, courts disagree as to whether the corporate veil need be
pierced to extend full liability to a parent corporation. This disagreement,
however, is largely a function of the courts' differing interpretations of the
alter ego doctrine. Clearly, courts on both sides of the issue have placed
ultimate importance on the parent's control over its subsidiary. In fact,
most courts have consistently examined the same general factors in reaching
a conclusion on the issue of parental control over the subsidiary.
In spite of 4he consistency in the factors examined, one critical factor has
been applied exclusively by the direct liability line of decisions. Several
courts implementing the direct liability approach have supported the imposition of liability where the parent corporation simply knew of, and had
the capacity to prevent, a release caused by its subsidiary.' 24 This "awareness" factor will clearly be satisfied where parental control or domination
is present. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, that factor could be
117. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990).
118. Id.
119. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1045.
120. Id.
121. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27-28.
122. Id.at 27.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v.
Nicolet Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1980).
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satisfied even where such control or domination cannot be established. In
such a case, a parent corporation could be held liable even though it did
not exercise extreme control over its subsidiary. Therefore, that concept
might allow liability to be imposed on a parent where none would exist
under traditional notions of the alter ego doctrine.
Notwithstanding this exception, courts have apparently been concerned
with the same general factors. While courts addressing this issue have applied
different reasoning to reach different conclusions, these cases can largely
be reconciled by a thorough analysis of differing factual circumstances. Yet
in order to ameliorate further confusion, it is imperative to develop a
uniform process by which courts may analyze and decide cases of this
nature.
Commentators have suggested that parent corporations should be held
"categorically liable" for their responsible subsidiaries. 12 While the nature
of this rule undoubtedly lends itself to uniformity, it may also serve to
penalize corporaticns for nothing more than having ownership of a responsible subsidiary. To recognize such a rule would be to entirely abandon the
concept of limited liability.
Indeed, this theory proposes to entirely destroy the legal fiction of the
corporate entity. Such a theory would clearly punish corporations which
have relied on well-established rules of corporate law. Thus, while this
approach may help effectuate the goals of CERCLA, it completely abandons
traditional corporate doctrines.
Another author has proposed that individual officers of a corporation
should be held liable on the basis of a theory of personal participation in
tortious conduct. 2 5 A corporate officer is examined independently of the
issue of corporateness. 27 While such a proposal has merit, it may lose
applicability in the parent/subsidiary context.
Applying this theory by analogy to the parent/subsidiary setting, a parent
corporation, which knew of and had the capacity to prevent a release by
its subsidiary, may escape liability if it was not sufficiently "participating"
in its subsidiary's tortious conduct. Several courts adhering to the direct
liability approach placed great emphasis on this "awareness" factor. 28 Thus,
under such circumstances, the theory may unnecessarily frustrate the goals
of CERCLA.
Clearly, the ideal solution would be a rule which balances these competing
policy interests, relaxing one body of law in order to accommodate the
other.

125. See Allen, supra note 42; see also Note, Liability, supra note 21.
126. Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil: Corporate Officer Liability for Response
Costs Under the ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 17
U. ToL. L. REv. 923 (1986).
127. Id. at 971.
128. United States v. Nicolet Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States
v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp,. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp.
665, 671 (D. Idaho 1980).
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V. Proposed Solution: A Uniform Alter Ego Doctrine
Under the Federal Common Law

A proposed solution to the parent liability issue is the development of a
uniform alter ego doctrine. 29 Under this test, the court should focus solely
on the issue of parental control over the subsidiary. For purposes of
uniformity, the court should limit its initial focus to the following five
factors:
(1) parental domination over the day-to-day operations and
activities of the subsidiary;
(2) parental exertion of financial control over the subsidiary;
(3) parental disregard of basic corporate formalities, such as
keeping separate books and records and holding shareholder and
board meetings;
(4) gross undercapitalization of subsidiary operations;
(5) parental awareness of, benefit from, and ability to prevent
the release of hazardous substances caused by its subsidiary. 310
These factors should be given primary importance. If, however, these five
factors are not conclusive on the issue of control, the court can look to
other factors traditionally viewed as indicia of parental control.' The
ultimate question should be whether, in view of these factors, the subsidiary
corporation is merely an instrument of its parent. If that question is
answered in the affirmative, the parent should be held liable for any portion
of a judgment which is incapable of being satisfied by its subsidiary.
The proposed test does not differ drastically from what some courts have
already done by implication. Summarily, this test is an attempt to combine
the factors considered important by courts on both sides of the issue. There
are, however, several reasons why this test may present a more effective
process by which to resolve the parent liability issue.
First, factors one through four have been used in a majority of the
traditional alter ego tests. These factors are widely accepted as indicia of
extreme parental control over a subsidiary. Additionally, because a court
may look to other factors where those listed are not sufficient, the court
maintains its discretion to reach a decision based upon the facts as a whole.
Such discretion corresponds directly with legislative history recognizing CERCLA issues as warranting a case-by-case analysis.1 2 Therefore, a test fo-

129. A proposal similar to this one has been made by another author in a general corporate
context. See generally Note, Corporate Veil, supra note 50. However, that proposal differs
somewhat in that it contains two prongs. Additionally, the fifth factor of the solution proposed
in this note adds an entirely different dimension to the concept of the alter ego doctrine.
130. This portion of the alter ego test is tailored to the precise circumstances presented by
CERCLA violations. However, this factor could be generalized to apply to the violation of
any federal statute which raises the alter ego issue.
131. See supra note 60.
132. H.R. REp. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 6136 (1980).
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cusing on these factors should appeal to courts which adhere to traditional
corporate doctrines. At the same time, many of these same factors have
been the ultimate concern of courts taking the opposite (direct liability)
approach.
Second, the inclusion of the fifth factor adds a new dimension to traditional alter ego tests. This factor serves to prevent parent corporations from
escaping liability under the traditional factors by simply developing other
methods by which to control their subsidiaries. In addition, it encourages
a parent that is aware of a hazardous release by a subsidiary to respond
before the problem becomes more expensive. This factor also places the
responsibility on the corporation which is benefitting from the hazardous
release.
Nevertheless, consideration of this factor would not serve to punish a
parent which is benefitting from the subsidiary, but for lack of control is
unaware of the hazardous release. In short, this factor liberalizes the test
so as to place greater significance on the substance of the parent/subsidiary
relationship rather than on the form under which such relationship may be
disguised.' Therefore, this factor serves to promote a more equitable
outcome.
A third benefit of this proposal is that it contains no requirement for
fraudulent intent by the parent corporation. Because of the difficulty in
proving fraud, this element has been somewhat of a barrier to piercing the
corporate veil. However, fraud is not required for an alter ego finding in
tort cases. 3 4 Thus, because CERCLA liability is essentially grounded in
tort, 3 5 the element of fraud is, likewise, not required for an alter ego finding
in CERCLA cases. 3 6
Further, the factors of this test make proof of purposeful undercapitalization or dissolution of the subsidiary to escape CERCLA liability unnecessary. Moreover, while parental awareness is a factor to be considered,
such awareness is not mandated by the test. This test therefore harmonizes
with the interpretation of CERCLA as a strict liability statute.
Fourth, the proposed test strikes a balance between competing policy
interests. The factors of the test recognize the corporate form as a legitimate
method by which an investing corporation may limit its liability. The test
requires a finding of parental control sufficient to warrant piercing the
corporate veil under the alter ego doctrine. It is also constructed to make
only moderate deviations from existing law. Consequently, this test would
certainly appeal to courts desiring to protect traditional corporate doctrines.
133. Courts considerng the alter ego issue have expressed concern over this premise of
substance over form. Se, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,
540 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976) (where court held that in alter ego cases, courts should
focus on reality, not form).
134. Some courts deem fraud an element essential to piercing the corporate veil in contract
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 692 (5th Cir. 1985). Other
cases have held that fraud need not be shown at all. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v.

W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
135. See Comment, supra note 126, at 971.
136. Jon-T Chems., 768 F.2d at 692; see also Comment, supra note 126, at 971.
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At the same time, the fifth factor and the absence of an intent requirement
allow the broad remedial goals of CERCLA to overcome the corporate
fiction where equity so demands. Accordingly, the test should also be readily
accepted by courts adhering to the direct liability approach. Finally, this
test strives for clarity and uniformity, both of which will enable a more
effective resolution of the parental liability issue in future cases.
Conclusion
As expected, the enactment of CERCLA has dramatically affected many
areas of the law. However, while CERCLA is a welcome addition, it does
not warrant abandonment of other laws which have proven successful over
time. Rather, courts should interpret CERCLA in harmony with other
established laws. Such an interpretation can only be achieved by balancing
the policy goals which underlie both CERCLA and existing laws. Moreover,
courts must strive for uniformity in this balancing process.
CERCLA's goals are certainly important. Its enactment was obviously a
response to our nation's desire to immediately curtail further destruction of
the environment. However, the corporate doctrine of limited liability is
equally important. Indeed, "it is on this assumption that large undertakings
are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted. ''31 Clearly, courts cannot ignore either of the important policies
which underlie these laws. Therefore, the solution to this conflict is a
uniform alter ego doctrine which strikes a balance between the competing
policy interests.
Mark R. McPhail

137. Jon-T Chems., 768 F.2d at 690 (quoting Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
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